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Abstract: 
We show that the Strong Pareto Superior (SPS) allocation, due to (Marjit & 
Sarkar, 2017) does not hold in a special scenario. 
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Introduction: 
(Marjit & Sarkar, 2017) have proved the existence of a unique inequality-preserving redistribution 
allocation in the contract curve. They call the allocation as Strong Pareto Superior allocation 
(SPS) and argue that the result is true irrespective of whether one considers an absolute measure 
of inequality or the leftist measure, or a relative measure of inequality or the rightist measure, 
even though they show that the results are different for both. The measures are called ASPS 
allocation and RSPS allocation respectively. In this paper, we cast doubt on their result of the 
existence of SPS allocation in a special scenario, which (Marjit & Sarkar, 2017) may not have 
specifically addressed. 
Background to this paper: 
(Venkatasubramanian et al., 2015) (VLS henceforth) had argued that some amount of income 
inequality is fair. By their way of fairness, they measure inequality by paying people according to 
their productivity and since people inherently differ in their productivity, they get paid differently. 
The resulting inequality is 'fair' according to them, which moves away from a leftist measure of 
being egalitarian in paying everyone equally, the result of which according to them will lead to 
bifurcations in pay-outs to the employees in the presence of perfectly competitive employees and 
firms. 
Even when people and firm’s actions seem random from epistemic exterior stand point with their 
underlying behavior of selfishness being in contrast to the teleologically random movements 
exhibited by a set of molecules in a closed container; they argue that the thermodynamic measure 
of 'entropy' can be a measure of ‘fair’ inequality. We refer the reader to VLS paper for a convincing 
argument on why entropy can be a measure of a ‘fairness’ imbibed inequality.  
(Marjit et al., 2019) gives an empirical illustration of their SPS allocation by using different 
measures of inequality, namely., absolute measure, relative measure using Gini and for 
generalized entropy with e = 0, 1, 2. However, the result does not seem to hold for the VLS 
measure of ‘fairness’ imbibed inequality. When we proceed along the lines of (Marjit et al., 2019), 
and introduce a transfer amount of ‘T’  from the person having high income post-growth to a 
person with low income post-growth, then for this entropy as a measure of inequality, there simply 
does not exist a transfer amount that preserves inequality post-distribution, casting doubt on the 
results of (Marjit & Sarkar, 2017), taking away the hope that we may have had the possibility of a 
distribution-neutral fiscal policy, as (Marjit et al., 2019) calls it. However, as (Marjit et al., 2019) 
show, the transfer amount do exist for the generalized entropy measure, which is an often cited 
measure of inequality in the literature. 
Our claim:  
The VLS fair measure of entropy is given by 𝑆 = 12 + ln(2∗𝜎2∗∏)2 +  µ;  
where, µ and σ are the mean and standard deviation of the income distribution. 
 
In the following, we take ‘a’ and ‘b’ as two income levels and calculate y1 = ln(a) and y2 = ln(b); 
since for the VLS measure, the income distribution is a log-normal distribution. 
Given: an income profile of (y1, y2), which becomes (g1y1, g2y2) after growth. (Without loss of 
generality, we assume y1 > y2, g1 > g2). Let ‘T’ be the transfer amount from person 1 to person 2, 
and after redistribution, the incomes profiles are (g1y1 - T, g2y2 + T).  
Since we want the inequality to remain same after transfer, we have S1 = S2 
 12 + ln(2∗𝜎12∗∏)2 +  µ1 =  12 + ln(2∗𝜎22∗∏)2 +  µ2                                              …………eq (1) 
 
 𝑙𝑛 (𝜎1 / 𝜎2)  =  µ2 −  µ1                                                                              ………….eq (2) 
For the two given income profiles pre- and post- growth, for a transfer amount ‘T’ to exist, this 
boils down to the requirement of, 
 (𝑦1 − 𝑦2)2(𝑔1𝑦1 − 𝑔2𝑦2)2  >  𝑒^(𝑔1𝑦1 + 𝑔2𝑦2 − 𝑦1 − 𝑦2) 
 
Since the denominator of the LHS is a relatively big number, and since the RHS is raised to the 
power of an exponential, this inequality does not hold, at least for some incomes, thereby making 
it a proposition against the claim of the existence of a distribution-neutral transfer amount. A crude 
example is y1 = 5, y2 = 2, g1 = 3, g2 = 2. 
 
This is equivalent to saying that either the (Marjit & Sarkar, 2017) result is not robust to the 
measure of inequality one takes; or that a ‘fairness’ imbibed income inequality measure will never 
require transfers. We assume the latter not to be the case because there’s a change in inequality 
post- growth, which necessitates transfers. 
 
We state it as a proposition, whose proof is obvious:  
The existence of SPS allocation is untrue for a ‘fair’ measure of inequality, as measured by 
thermodynamic entropy.  
 
Addressing our limitation:  
The limitation of our argument is that, the VLS measure of entropy doesn't fall in the relative 
measure of inequality or in the absolute level of inequality or anywhere in between, but outside of 
it. For instance, let's consider an economy with two people having income (10, 20). Consider the 
growth process in this economy to have resulted in an income profile of (100, 200). Then by the 
relative measure, the inequality is preserved, since relative measure of inequality is scale 
invariant. Now, consider the growth process to have resulted in an income profile of (100,110). 
Then the absolute level of inequality is preserved since absolute measures are translation 
invariant. In literature, the absolute measure, which is dubbed the leftist measure happens to be 
a conservative estimate, however we will see now that the VLS measure of inequality as 
measured by entropy is far more conservative than the absolute measure itself, casting doubt on 
whether (Marjit & Sarkar, 2017) even addressed this issue. (We give further explanations in the 
following para.) Irrespective of whether they address this case or not, we do not have an 
inequality-preserving fiscal redistribution in terms of ‘fairness’, so to say. 
For the given income profiles above, the VLS inequality measured by entropy goes up from 18.03 
to 108.03, whereas the absolute measure has to remain intact at 18.03. In this sense, the VLS 
measure of entropy is more conservative than the absolute measure of inequality.  
For clarification, we consider the in-between case of RSPS and ASPS, which (Marjit & Sarkar, 
2017) had not explicitly stated. We need to see whether an income distribution which takes the 
form y1’ = g1y1 + b; and y2’ = g2y2 + b post- growth will be robust to the result of existence of SPS 
allocation. This is an income transformation which after an inequality-preserving transfer amount 
‘T’, makes it a relative-absolute SPS measure. 
 
Following (Marjit & Sarkar, 2017), we proceed as follows: 
 𝑦1−𝑏𝑦2−𝑏  = 𝑔1𝑦1−𝑏−𝑇𝑔2𝑦2−𝑏+𝑇  
 
 𝑇 = [𝑦1𝑦2 (𝑔1−𝑔2)+𝑏(𝑦1−𝑦2)+𝑏(𝑔2𝑦2−𝑔1𝑦1)]𝑦1+𝑦2−2𝑏  
 
Implying, a transfer amount does exist for even a relative-absolute inequality measure.  
 
To conclude, we wish to bring it to the attention that the VLS measure of inequality satisfy all the 
four axioms of (Marjit et al., 2019), namely, Transfer axiom, Symmetry axiom, Normalization 
axiom and Population Variance axiom. Hence, even though (Marjit & Sarkar, 2017; Marjit et al., 
2019) are unpublished papers, our proposition of non-existence of distribution-neutral fiscal policy 
in terms of ‘fairness’ – is both valid from meeting the assumptions point of view – serves as an 
interim note on the SPS allocation; and is bad news for anyone concerned about justice and 
fairness, including us. 
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